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SEMEL IN VITA: DESCARTES’ STOIC VIEW
ON THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN HUMAN LIFE
David Cunning
In his June 1643 lett er to Princess Elizabeth, Descartes makes a claim that is 
a bit surprising given the hyper-intellectualism of the Meditations and other 
texts. He says that philosophy is something that we should do only rarely. 
Here I show how Descartes’ recommendation falls out of other components of 
his system—in particular his stoicism and his views on embodiment. A conse-
quence of my reading is that to an important degree the reasoning of the Fourth 
Meditation is the imprecise reasoning of a not-yet-Cartesian meditator.
In the early stages of articulating his ethical views to Princess Elizabeth, 
Descartes makes a claim that might seem a bit odd against the background 
of the hyper-intellectualism of the Meditations. He says,
I am almost afraid that Your Highness may think that I am not now 
speaking seriously; but that would go against the respect which I owe 
her and which I will never cease to show her. I can say with truth that 
the chief rule I have always observed in my studies, which I think 
has been the most useful to me in acquiring what knowledge I have, 
has been never to spend more than a few hours a day in the thoughts 
which occupy the imagination and a few hours a year on the thoughts 
which occupy the intellect alone. I have given all of the rest of my 
time to the relaxation of the senses and the repose of the mind.1
In the Second Meditation Descartes emphasizes our nature as thinking 
things, and we might expect that his views on how best to live would be 
commensurate with that nature. However, he recommends to Elizabeth 
that philosophy be done sparingly. He himself appreciates the unexpect-
edness of the recommendation. He is a philosopher, and someone who 
throughout his corpus speaks to the height of philosophical activity, but 
he says that for the most part it should be avoided.
In this paper I do four things. In section one, I lay out Descartes’ place 
in a tradition in which minds and intellectual activity are regarded as 
far superior to bodies and bodily activities. Descartes embraces some 
of this tradition, but he thinks that bodies have been undervalued. In 
section two, I consider Descartes’ stoicism and the pillars of his system 
that entail it. I argue that it is from this stoicism, in conjunction with his 
view that fi nite wills are oft en frustrated by bodily processes, that he 
generates the view that philosophy is to be done sparingly. In section 
three I consider the objection that for Descartes fi nite wills are wholly 
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unconstrained. I conclude with a brief discussion of Descartes’ status as 
an anti-philosophical philosopher.
I
There are a number of places in which Descartes represents the mind and 
its activities as more exalted than the activities of the body. For example, 
he writes that
[B]ecause nobody except God knows everything perfectly, we have 
to content ourselves with knowing the truths most useful to us. The 
fi rst and chief of these is that there is a God on whom all things 
depend. . . . The second thing we must know is the nature of our 
soul. We must know that it subsists apart from the body, and is much 
nobler than the body, and that it is capable of enjoying countless sat-
isfactions not to be found in this life.2
At the end of the Third Meditation he says that one of these satisfactions 
results from disembodied refl ection upon the greatness of God.3 For the 
time being, however, we are stuck in “the prison of the body.”4 Accord-
ingly, it is
this same contemplation [of the divine majesty], albeit much less 
perfect, [that] enables us to know the greatest joy of which we are 
capable in this life. (AT 7:52)
In the 1 November 1646 lett er to Chanut, Descartes says that if it did not 
have the ability to experience passions,
our soul would have no reason to wish to remain joined to its body 
for even one minute. . . .5
When he repeatedly refers to Gassendi as Flesh in Fift h Replies, he is 
certainly not intending a compliment.6 On the fl ipside, Gassendi is not 
imagining things when he assumes that Descartes would prefer to be 
identifi ed as Mind.7
Descartes regards the mind and its pursuits as more noble than those of 
the body. However, he allows that body has some value, as presumably he 
should if he is also going to hold that the extended universe is a creature 
of God. He says that we would have no reason to wish to remain joined 
to our bodies if we did not have the ability to experience passions, but of 
course we do have the ability to experience passions. He thus writes that
the pleasures of the body are minor. . . . However, I do not think that 
they should be altogether despised, or even that one should free one-
self altogether from the passions.8
Indeed, he says that there are benefi ts to having passions and that a person 
is bett er oﬀ  for taking advantage of these:
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[T]he pleasures common to it [the soul] and the body depend entirely 
on the passions, so that persons whom the passions can move most 
deeply are capable of enjoying the sweetest pleasures of this life.9
The pleasure that accompanies a passion is not the qualitative equal of the 
pleasure of a disembodied mind, but in this life we are not disembodied.
Descartes is not alone among rationalist-minded thinkers in placing 
a higher value on mind than body. In the Platonic tradition, “the true 
philosopher despises” bodily things.10 The body “keeps us busy in a 
thousand ways because of its need for nurture” (66b), and “makes us too 
busy to practise philosophy” (66d). Accordingly, “the philosopher frees 
the soul from association with the body as much as possible” (64e–65a). 
For Socrates, souls are invisible, intangible, indivisible, and divine, and 
bodies are their opposite (78b–80b). Because a soul is what activates a 
body, a soul is active, and its opposite (body) is “death” (105c–e). Later 
fi gures then absorb the view that body is a low-grade kind of being. In 
“On Beauty,” Plotinus oﬀ ers an extended diatribe against the body.11 His 
disciple Augustine continues the barrage:
How highly do you value th[e] will? You surely do not think it 
should be compared with wealth or honours or physical pleasures, 
or even all of these together. . . . Then should we not rejoice a litt le 
that we have something in our souls—this very thing that I call a 
good will—in comparison with which those things we mentioned 
are utt erly worthless . . . ?12
For Augustine, body is so bad that sin consists in turning our att ention 
away from eternal things to things that are temporal and corporeal (27).
This kind of thinking fi nds its way into the seventeenth century as well. 
The Cartesian (and Augustinian) philosopher Nicholas Malebranche calls 
on us to resist the allure of the bodies that surround us and look instead to 
the “land of ideas.”13 In the course of defending his occasionalism, he infers 
from the “immutable law that inferior things serve superior ones” that bod-
ies cannot act upon souls.14 Malebranche’s contemporary Ralph Cudworth 
argues that bodies are at the bott om of the hierarchy of creatures:
There is unquestionably, a Scale or Ladder of Nature, and Degrees of 
Perfection and Entity, one above another, as of Life, Sense, and Cogi-
tation, above Dead, Sensless and Unthinking Matt er; or Reason and 
Understanding above Sense, &c.15
Cudworth agrees with Malebranche that bodies cannot act upon souls, 
but he also holds that “it is not so decorous in respect of God . . . [to] do all 
the meanest and trifl ingest things himself drudgingly.”16 Accordingly, He 
does not att end to corporeal aﬀ airs.17 Anne Conway defends the view that 
body is so terrible that God would not, and did not, create it:
how can any dead thing proceed from him or be created by him, 
such as mere body or matt er . . . ? It has truly been said that God 
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does not make death. It is equally true that he did not make any dead 
thing, for how can a dead thing come from him who is infi nite life 
and love? Or, how can any creature receive so vile and diminished 
an essence from him (who is so infi nitely generous and good) . . . ?18
For Conway, God only creates souls, and so the everyday objects that sur-
round us are something other than what we thought.19 Descartes is clearly 
in the tradition of these thinkers. He takes body to be of some value, but it 
is not as exalted as mind.
II
In this section I consider Descartes’ stoicism and its implications for the ques-
tion of the extent to which an embodied mind should do philosophy.20 In 
eﬀ ect I am following up on Descartes’ claim that although the “satisfactions” 
of the mind are enormous, for the most part they are “not to be found in this 
life.” We should instead rest content with the goods that are open to us.
As it is for Leibniz and Spinoza, for Descartes stoicism is the ethical 
theory that best squares with the doctrine of divine immutability.21 He 
says to Elizabeth,
[t]he fi rst and chief of [the truths most useful to us] is that there is a 
God on whom all things depend, whose perfections are infi nite, whose 
power is immense and whose decrees are infallible. This teaches us to 
accept calmly all the things which happen to us as expressly sent by 
God. Moreover, since the true object of love is perfection, when we 
lift  up our minds to consider him as he is, we fi nd ourselves naturally 
so inclined to love him that we even rejoice in our aﬄ  ictions at the 
thought that they are an expression of his will.22
It is true that some of us might entertain a standard of goodness according 
to which not everything that happens is good. If so, we are not taking into 
account all of the relevant data, and the judgments that we make in the 
light of this standard will be hasty.23 We must also take into account, and 
indeed privilege, the unrevisable axioms of metaphysics (e.g., that God is 
perfect and immutable). When we take the right kind of perspective on 
events we see that
there is nothing to show that the present life is bad. . . .24
We see that
[t]rue philosophy . . . teaches that even amid the saddest disasters 
and most bitt er pains we can always be content, provided that we 
know how to use our reason.25
Descartes’ God preordains all events from eternity, and His immutable 
will does not depart from the preordained order.26 What happens will 
happen anyway, and in addition it will be good.27 Descartes writes,
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In my view, the way to reach the love of God is to consider that he 
is a mind, or a thing that thinks; . . . we must also take account of 
the infi nity of his power, by which he has created so many things of 
which we are only a tiny part. . . . Finally, we must weigh our small-
ness against the greatness of the created universe. . . . If a man med-
itates on these things and understands them properly, he is fi lled 
with extreme joy. . . . Joining himself willingly entirely to God, he 
loves him so perfectly that he desires nothing at all except that his 
will should be done. Henceforth, because he knows that nothing can 
befall him which God has not decreed, he no longer fears death, pain 
or disgrace. He so loves this divine decree, deems it so just and so 
necessary, and knows that he must be so completely subject to it that 
even when he expects it to bring death or some other evil, he would 
not will to change it even if, per impossible, he could do so. He does 
not shun evils or aﬄ  ictions, because they come to him from divine 
providence; still less does he eschew the permissible goods or plea-
sures he may enjoy in this life, since they too come from God. He 
accepts them with joy, without any fear of evils, and his love makes 
him perfectly happy.28
For Descartes, stoicism is the ethical theory that best squares with the doc-
trines of divine immutability and divine omnibenevolence.
Another feature of stoicism that Descartes fi nds att ractive is the empha-
sis that it puts on decreasing the extent to which our wills are subordinated 
to bodily infl uences. Descartes speaks to the control of the body over the 
will in a number of passages. For example, he says to Elizabeth that
each person wants to make himself happy; but many people do not 
know how to, and oft en a bodily disposition prevents their will from 
being free. . . . [There is] nothing more distressing than being at-
tached to a body which altogether takes away its freedom.29
In Passions of the Soul, he speaks again of the body as limiting the freedom 
of the will and says that in some cases the will is enslaved:
[opposing passions] pull the will fi rst to one side and then to the 
other, thus making it batt le against itself and so putt ing the soul in 
the most deplorable state possible. . . . [The] two passions jostle the 
will in opposite ways; and since the will obeys fi rst the one and then 
the other, it is continually opposed to itself, and so it renders the soul 
enslaved and miserable.30
For Descartes, passions are caused by motions on the pineal gland.31 As 
passions incline the will, corporeal motions are sometimes in charge of 
how the will inclines.
A passion is just one example of a corporeal eﬀ ect that infl uences the 
will. Descartes also holds that corporeal processes are responsible for the 
ambivalence that a will undergoes aft er adopting a new belief in place of 
an old one. In the First Meditation, he speaks of the power of long-standing 
commitments to
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keep coming back, and, despite my wishes, [to] capture my belief, 
which is as it were bound over to them as a result of long occupation 
and custom.32
Descartes holds more generally that no matt er how much philosophical 
refl ecting we do, our pre-philosophical conceptions work to hold their 
ground:
In later years the mind is no longer a total slave to the body, and 
does not refer everything to it. Indeed, it inquires into the truth of 
things considered in themselves, and discovers very many of its pre-
vious judgements to be false. But despite this, it is not easy for the 
mind to erase these false judgements from its memory; and as long 
as they stick there, they can cause a variety of errors. For example, 
in our early childhood we imagined stars as being very small; and 
although astronomical arguments now clearly show us that they are 
very large indeed, our preconceived opinion is still strong enough to 
make it very hard for us to imagine them diﬀ erently from the way 
we did before.33
The cognitive processes that Descartes is mentioning here are largely 
physiological. Imaginings are “shadows and pictures of” the bodies that 
we encounter in sensation,34 and both involve the soul inspecting a fi g-
ure on the pineal gland.35 A sensation always occurs independently of our 
will; the soul inspects a fi gure that has been traced on the pineal gland by 
bodies that pass through the nerves.36 When we imagine something the 
fi gure is traced either by a volition of the soul or, in less intentional cases, 
by bodies in the brain that as a result of purely mechanistic processes trace 
fi gures that are similar to the ones normally traced through the nerves.37 
In the latt er kind of case, will and imagination can work at odds. When we 
want to imagine something, we have a volition that makes
the [pineal] gland lean . . . fi rst to one side and then to another, thus 
driving the spirits towards diﬀ erent regions of the brain until they 
come upon the one containing the traces of the object we want to 
remember.38
If, as sometimes occurs in the case of imagination, something other than our 
will drives the spirits to appropriate traces in the brain, we might recall an 
opinion that we have habitually aﬃ  rmed and have assumed is indubitable. 
In particular, when we do philosophy and so talk and think about things 
like God, bodies, and the soul, the discussion will lead us to remember our 
“preconceived opinion[s]” about these, to ill-eﬀ ect.39 If Descartes holds that 
the physical causes of a particular memory can be in place independently 
of our will, he would expect that many of us would stagger in the course 
of doing philosophy.
Our embodiment also interferes with our ability to do philosophy in so 
far as we are almost constantly bombarded with perceptions of sensible 
bodies. In the Fift h Meditation, Descartes remarks that one of the things 
that keeps us from a clear and distinct perception of God’s existence is that 
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“the images of things perceived by the senses . . . besiege my thought on 
every side . . . .”40 Our perceptions of such bodies make it very diﬃ  cult for 
us to turn our att ention to anything else:
We know by experience that our minds are so closely joined to our 
bodies as to be almost always acted upon by them; and although when 
thriving in an adult and healthy body the mind enjoys some liberty to 
think of other things than those presented by the senses, we know 
there is not the same liberty in those who are sick or asleep or very 
young. . . . I have no doubt that if it [the mind] were released from the 
prison of the body, it would fi nd [its innate ideas] within itself.41
A signifi cant part of what it is to do philosophy, according to Descartes, 
is to att end to principles and ideas that do not “accord with the senses.”42 
We must divorce ourselves from sensible objects,43 but to do so is to fi ght 
and resist our embodiment and to live and re-live the confl ict between 
the truth and our long-standing commitments. This kind of torment and 
frenzy is not to be encouraged:
happiness consists, it seems to me, in a perfect contentment of mind 
and inner satisfaction, which is not commonly possessed by those 
who are most favoured by fortune, and which is acquired by the 
wise without fortune’s favor. So vivere beate, to live happily, is just to 
have a perfectly content and satisfi ed mind.44
As a stoic Descartes regards tranquility of mind as an end in itself.45 He 
thinks that “free will is in itself the noblest thing we can have, since it makes 
us in a way equal to God,”46 but he does not thereby think that our freedom 
consists in the independence that marks the divine will. This is instead a 
standard to which we should aspire.47 One way that we can protect the 
will from disturbances is by working on the body to keep our passions in 
moderation.48 Another is to have a fi rm and unwavering resolve to do what 
we take to be best in a given situation, and to appreciate that because that 
is the most that a fi nite mind can do, we should never feel regret if things 
turn out poorly.49 Another is to direct the will from circumstances that are 
bound to wreak havoc on it.50
According to Descartes, an embodied mind is not suited for philosophi-
cal refl ection. Not only do episodes of philosophical refl ection disturb the 
will, they will be counter-productive if they are not brief, and if they are 
not few and far between:
[o]ur nature is so constituted that our mind needs much relaxation 
if it is to be able to spend usefully a few moments in the search for 
truth. Too great application to study does not refi ne the mind, but 
wears it down.51
In the course of doing philosophy, the infl uences of the body inevitably 
present themselves and make us think in ways that interfere with our 
progress. We remember our pre-conceived opinions, and in our weakened 
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state regard them as plausible. We become agitated, and ambivalent, and 
our att empts to press ahead will yield at best diminishing returns.52 Simply 
put, philosophy is not for us. We might regret that we can only do so much 
of it, but as a stoic Descartes thinks that we should conform our wills to the 
reality in which we fi nd ourselves:
we should not reckon the time which we could have spent on in-
structing ourselves by comparison with the number of hours we 
have had at our disposition but rather, I think, by comparison with 
what we see commonly happens to others, as an indication of the 
normal scope of the human mind.53
There are activities that are more suitable for an embodied mind, and we 
should pursue those instead.54 We must appreciate what is possible for us 
and what is not, and adjust our desires accordingly.55
III
A potential problem for the argumentation of section two is that there are 
passages in which Descartes appears to insist that fi nite wills are free in a 
libertarian sense.56 That argumentation depends on the premise that fi nite 
wills are oft en constrained and even enslaved by bodily processes, but if 
Descartes is a libertarian he does not accept this premise. Indeed, if fi nite 
wills are radically free, and if the activities of the mind are more exalted 
than those of the body, it is not clear why we should not exercise our liber-
tarian freedom and do as much philosophy as possible.
One passage in which Descartes might appear to be supporting a liber-
tarian view of human freedom is in his 1645 lett er to Mesland. There, he 
says that
absolutely speaking . . . it is always open to us to hold back from pur-
suing a clearly known good, or from admitt ing a clearly perceived 
truth, provided we consider it a good thing to demonstrate the free-
dom of our will by so doing.57
One of the reasons that this passage might appear to be evidence for the 
view that Descartes is a libertarian is that in other texts he is explicit that 
clear and distinct perceptions are utt erly will-compelling.58 If it is always 
open to us to refrain from admitt ing a clearly perceived truth, it must be 
possible for us to resist compulsion in any other situation as well.59
An examination of the larger context of the passage in the Mesland 
lett er shows that it is not evidence that Descartes holds that fi nite wills 
are free in a libertarian sense. In the previous lett er to Mesland Descartes 
had said that
I agree with you when you say that we can suspend our judgment; 
but I tried to explain in what manner this can be done. For it seems to 
me certain that a great light in the intellect is followed by a great in-
clination in the will; so that if we see very clearly that a thing is good 
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for us, it is very diﬃ  cult—and on my view impossible, as long as one 
continues in the same thought—to stop the course of our desire.60
Descartes’ view that clear and distinct perceptions are will-compelling is 
the view that so long as the intellect has a clear and distinct idea, it is 
impossible for the will to refrain from aﬃ  rming it.61 What it is for a fi nite 
mind to clearly and distinctly perceive X is for its intellect to have a clear 
and distinct idea of X and for its will to aﬃ  rm X, but while the intellect is 
presenting this clear and distinct idea, the will cannot stop aﬃ  rming it to 
turn its att ention to something else. Instead, another idea must be put in 
place of the clear and distinct idea, and by something other than the will. 
As Descartes says by way of qualifi cation in the February 1645 lett er, we 
suspend judgment when something else distracts the will from a clear and 
distinct idea—for example the desire to exhibit our freedom.62 The corre-
spondence with Mesland does not provide any evidence that Descartes is 
a libertarian.
A second piece of apparent evidence for the view that Descartes has 
a libertarian account of human freedom is that he thinks that we merit 
praise and blame for what we do. He says in Principles I:37,
We do not praise automatons for accurately producing all the move-
ments they were designed to perform, because the production of 
these movements occurs necessarily. It is the designer who is praised 
for constructing such carefully-made devices; for in constructing 
them he acted not out of necessity but freely. By the same principle, 
when we embrace the truth, our doing so voluntarily is much more 
to our credit than would be the case if we could not do otherwise.63
This passage does not refl ect the view that Descartes is a libertarian. He 
indeed suggests that a necessary condition of meriting praise or blame is 
being able to “do otherwise,” but he is not thereby committ ed to the view 
that we are always able to do otherwise. The passage even raises questions 
about the unrestrictedness of fi nite will in cases of action in which we do 
merit praise or blame. Descartes says that when we embrace the truth, we 
do so voluntarily and merit praise. However, he also holds that we cannot 
help but aﬃ  rm what we clearly and distinctly perceive, and one of his 
most pronounced statements of this view appears just a few sections aft er 
Principles I:37, at AT 8A:21. If we cannot help but aﬃ  rm what we clearly 
and distinctly perceive, and if our aﬃ  rmations of clear and distinct per-
ceptions are still voluntary and free, then voluntariness is not a matt er of 
libertarian freedom.64
The remaining evidence for the view that Descartes holds that fi nite 
wills are wholly independent is the representation of freedom in the Fourth 
Meditation. Before considering that evidence, however, it is important to 
note that even if the Fourth Meditation confl icts with the view that fi nite 
wills are oft en determined by bodily processes, the latt er view is the pre-
dominant one in his corpus. We have considered numerous passages that 
refl ect this view, and neither the Mesland lett er nor Principles I:37 speaks 
against it.65 Still, it would be preferable if there was a natural way of reading 
the Fourth Meditation that did not have Descartes contradicting himself. 
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The contradiction would be egregious, and would be present in what is 
arguably his philosophical masterpiece.
In the Fourth Meditation Descartes defi nes will as “our ability to do or 
not do something” (AT 7:57) and emphasizes that when exercising will “we 
do not feel we are determined by any external force” (ibid.). He contrasts 
will with intellect, the other faculty involved in judgment. Whereas intellect 
is limited, in that “countless things may [and of course do] exist without 
there being any corresponding ideas in me” (AT 7:56), will is “not restrict-
ed in any way” (AT 7:57). Finite will is independent, and so independent 
that it is with respect to will, and not limited intellect, that human minds 
most resemble God (ibid.). The “scope of the will is wider than that of the 
intellect” (AT 7:58), and it is in the extent of the gulf between them that 
Descartes locates the source of human error. There is no denying that the 
Fourth Meditation view of freedom is to some degree libertarian. However, 
it is not necessarily the view that Descartes endorses in the fi nal analysis.
There are a number of passages in the Meditations that refl ect that in 
it the meditator is gradually advancing from a position of confusion to 
a position of clear and distinct perception.66 In the First Meditation, the 
meditator advances the view that “[w]hatever I have up till now accepted 
as most true I have acquired either from or through the senses” (AT 7:18). 
This is not evidence that Descartes accepts that view, and he in fact holds 
that our opinions about bodies are in part a matt er of “purely mental scru-
tiny.”67 In the Second Meditation the meditator announces that he “will 
use [his] imagination” (AT 7:27) to know himself bett er. This is not evi-
dence that Descartes accepts the view that we know our minds via imagi-
nation, and he in fact thinks that to use the imagination to know the soul 
is like “trying to use one’s eyes in order to hear sounds or smell odours.”68 
Later in the Second Meditation the meditator avers that “general percep-
tions are apt to be somewhat more confused” than particular ones (AT 
7:30). Upon further meditation, he appreciates that the nature of body is 
perceived by the mind alone and adds that
I am speaking of this particular piece of wax; the point is even clearer 
with regard to wax in general. (AT 7:31)
In the Fourth Meditation, the meditator considers that
whenever we are inquiring whether the works of God are perfect, we 
ought to look at the whole universe, not just at one created thing on 
its own. (AT 7:55)
Descartes himself holds that when we are inquiring whether the works 
of God are perfect, it is suﬃ  cient that we appreciate that for something to 
be good is just for it to be authored by God. The meditator of the Fourth 
Meditation is not there yet.69
In the Meditations Descartes is proceeding as a teacher. As he puts it, 
the method of the Meditations is a “method of instruction.”70 He is aware 
that his student is not yet a Cartesian, and he is aware that the fi rst-person 
reasoning of his student would refl ect this.71 So will Descartes’ att empts to 
instruct him:
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The philosopher knows that it is oft en useful to assume falsehoods 
instead of truths in this way in order to shed light on the truth, 
e.g. when astronomers imagine the equator, the zodiac, or other 
circles in the sky, or when geometers add new lines to given fi gures. 
Philosophers frequently do the same. If someone calls this ‘having 
recourse to artifi ce, sleight of hand and circumlocution’ and says it 
is unworthy of ‘philosophical honesty and the love of truth’ then he 
certainly shows that he himself, so far from being philosophically 
honest or being prepared to employ any argument at all, simply 
wants to indulge in rhetorical display.72
Descartes thinks that in some cases what it means to be philosophically 
honest is to employ whatever pedagogical devices are necessary to help a 
student arrive at philosophical truth. Otherwise he would not arrive at it:
A philosopher would be no more surprised at such suppositions of 
falsity than he would be if, in order to straighten out a curved stick, 
we bent it round in the opposite direction.73
In Fourth Replies, Descartes notes that in demonstrating the properties 
of a sphere Archimedes would att ribute to spheres properties that they 
cannot possibly have. Rather than criticize that method, Descartes says 
that it was the
comparison between a sphere (or other curvilinear fi gure) and a 
rectilinear fi gure that enabled Archimedes to demonstrate various 
properties of the sphere which could scarcely be understood other-
wise. (AT 7:241)
Descartes reports that in the Third Meditation he is doing the same thing 
when he explains God’s self-creation in terms of eﬃ  cient causation even 
though talk of God as the eﬃ  cient cause of Himself “involves an evident 
contradiction” (AT 7:242). He admits that such talk is confused, but
[n]onetheless, all the above ways of talking, which are derived by 
analogy with the notion of eﬃ  cient causation, are very necessary for 
guiding the natural light in such a way as to enable us to have a clear 
awareness of these matt ers. (AT 7:241)
In the Third Meditation again, he illustrates the way in which our sensory 
ideas might represent non-things as things in terms of an idea of cold that 
represents cold as existing mind-independently, when perhaps it is only 
the absence of mind-independent heat (AT 7:43–44). Many of Descartes’ 
readers would allow that heat exists mind-independently, but Descartes 
himself thinks that like all such qualities it exists only as a sensation.74 And 
in the First Meditation, he allows that it is possible that God is a deceiver, 
and from the fi rst-person point-of-view concludes that the prospect of hy-
perbolic doubt is based on “powerful and well thought-out reasons” (AT 
7:21–22). Of course, it is totally incoherent:
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take the case of someone who imagines a deceiving god—even the 
true God, but not yet clearly enough known to himself or to the 
others for whom he frames his hypothesis. Let us suppose that he 
does not misuse this fi ction for the evil purpose of persuading oth-
ers to believe something false of the Godhead, but uses it only to 
enlighten the intellect, and bring greater knowledge of God’s nature 
to himself and to others. Such a person is in no way sinning in order 
that good may come. There is no malice at all in his action; he does 
something which is good in itself, and no one can rebuke him for it 
except slanderously.75
Descartes considers his students to be very confused, and in his att empts 
to help them to overcome their confusion he will sometimes make use of 
it so long as it is there. One of his aims in the Meditations is to guide us to 
the clear and distinct perceptions of metaphysics. His views on what our 
minds are like before we do philosophy entail that if he simply presents us 
with these perceptions we will bat them away.
We are left  with an interpretive decision when it comes to making sense 
of the claims of the Fourth Meditation. One option would be to say that 
Descartes is simply contradicting himself in putt ing them forward. This 
is certainly a possibility. However, Descartes is inviting us, indeed he is 
practically begging us, to proceed diﬀ erently. Outside of the Meditations 
he refl ects the view that fi nite wills are oft en subordinated to bodily pro-
cesses. Inside the Meditations he is representing the thinking of a meditator 
who is gradually advancing from a position of confusion, and he is explic-
it that in assisting the meditator he sometimes resorts to pedagogical de-
vices that are otherwise problematic. One interpretive option is to say that 
in making the Fourth Meditation claims about the absolute independence 
of fi nite will Descartes is contradicting himself. Another is to say that the 
claims are accepted by the meditator because he is not yet a Cartesian, and 
that they have a pedagogical function: gett ing the meditator to appreciate 
the extent of the gap between what we will and what we understand, for 
example, and gett ing him to appreciate that we are not helpless to close it. 
Descartes certainly holds that we all have an experience of freedom,76 and 
he highlights this experience in the Fourth Meditation, but that does not 
mean that he holds that fi nite will is not restricted in any way.77 The ability 
of the will is to aﬃ  rm or deny ideas, but it cannot do so unless the intellect 
considers these ideas: “we cannot will anything without understanding 
what we will.”78 A fi nite will is restricted in many ways, and a disembod-
ied will may well be radically free, but neither of these facts is the focus of 
the Fourth Meditation.
IV
Descartes has oft en been criticized for regarding the human being as es-
sentially a thinking thing—as a detached ego, alienated from the material 
world that is so beneath it.79 There are indeed passages in which he fo-
cuses on our nature as thinking things, but in very special circumstances, 
in which “once in the course of . . . life” (AT 7:17) we att empt to distance 
our minds from our bodies and arrive at fundamental truths about God 
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and His creation. Elsewhere Descartes emphasizes that we are embodied 
human beings, and that our minds and bodies form such a unity that they 
comprise a substance in their own right.80 He does some philosophy, but 
his conclusions entail that philosophy is not an activity in which an em-
bodied mind should regularly engage.81
Descartes is part of a distinguished tradition of philosophers who are 
at the same time anti-philosophical. In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
defends the view that things as they are in-themselves are neither spatial 
nor temporal. Part of the reason that he does this is to help us to miti-
gate our desire to pursue questions that torment us but that admit of no 
sett led answer:
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowl-
edge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very 
nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as tran-
scending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.82
If things-in-themselves are neither spatial nor temporal, and if the only 
kinds of objects that we can know are spatial or temporal, we can con-
clude in advance that we cannot know things-in-themselves and so can-
not answer questions about ultimate reality. A similar anti-philosophical 
tendency appears in the work of Witt genstein. He argues that what it is 
to do philosophy is to use everyday language to pose questions that that 
language is ill-equipped to ask. These questions seem to be meaningful, 
but until we notice that they are not we will continue to ask them, and 
to no avail.83 Kant and Witt genstein of course disagree with Descartes 
about whether or not we can know anything about ultimate reality. Des-
cartes thinks that we can know that God exists, for example, and that 
there are extended objects that exist independently of our perception of 
them. However, all of three of these fi gures conclude in their capacity as 
philosophers that our urge to engage in philosophical refl ection is in need 
of moderation.
Descartes is certainly right to hold that anyone who takes seriously the 
stoic aim of mental tranquility should temper their urge to do philosophy. 
He of course allows, and in fact insists, that an important part of what it is to 
be a human being is to be rational. Surprisingly enough, however, he sides 
with Hume in arguing that our rational side has been over-emphasized and 
that a plan of life that is suitable for a purely rational being is not a plan of 
action that is suitable for us.84 The latt er writes,
nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to [the] 
human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these 
biases [that is, our reasonable side, our sociable side, and our active 
side] to draw too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupa-
tions and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, 
but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct refer-
ence to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches 
I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which 
they introduce. . . . Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, 
be still a man.85
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Descartes agrees. He makes a compelling case for the view that in this life 
we should concentrate on the “relaxation of the senses and the repose of 
the mind.”86
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